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Chapter pages in book: (p. 31 - 52)1) Eleven industries have eitheralready reached a definitepeak in
production (judging from the duration,size, and continuity ofthe
subsequent decline), or show amarked decline in the rate of increase
in output (suggesting that theindicated high point may be theactual
peak, or at least is not far below it).
In nine of these industries adefinite peak in employment
has been reached: lumber,leather, paper and pulp, metalmining,
cement, tobacco, textiles,ferrous metals, and bituminouscoal.
In two there is no definitepeak or retardation in employ-
ment: malt liquorsand flour.
2) Three industries show nodefinite peak or retardation in pro-
duction.
In two of these a definitepeak in employment hasbeen
reached: petroleum and meatpacking.
In one there is rio definitepeak or retardation in employ-
ment: nonferrousmetals.
Despite some rather glaringdifferences in the behavior ofthe pro-
duction and employmentseries, due partly to our failure toseasonally
adjust the employmentseries, partly to lack ofcomparability in
coverage, andpartly to longer hours ofwork, the relation between
employment and production inthese basic industries seemsclear. In
all except three of the14 industries (malt liquors,flour, and non-
ferrous metals) employmenthas declined considerablyfrom the
levels reached in 1941 or 1942.Unless these declines arechecked, a
substantial rise in the totalproduction of industrialmaterials seems
very unlikelyand a moderate decline not atall unlikely. The latter
outcome would notbe without precedent; ourindex declined 4%
from 1917 to 1918.
IV INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS
OUTPUT AND TOTAL INDUSTRIAL
PRODUCTION IN PEACE ANDWAR
In Section I we madecertain tests of thevalidity of our industrial
materials production index,but deferred considerationof the relation
between the output ofindustrial materials andtotal industrial pro.
duction. Obviously therewould be little point in theforegoing.analYsis
if no relation were tobe expected. However,total industrial produc-
tion depends not only onthe output of materialsbut also on the rate
at which they areconsumed and on the amountof labor and other
factors of productionapplied to them. In thissection we attempt to
31show how our indexcompares, in theory, with an 'ideal'index of industrial production; andhow it compares, inpractice, with other
indexes that in certainrespects approximate the ideal.
An index of industrialproduction shouldpresumably includeall the products of the mining,manufacturing, andCOflSttUCtiOindus.. tries. It could be drawnup on either of two plans: (1)by obtaining a weighted aggregate of seriesrepresenting the output offinished goods and changes instocks of unfinished goods,the weights being chosen to exclude thepart of the value ofa good that is produced outside 'industry',or (2) by aggregating theoutput of both finished
and unfinished goods,the weights being chosento exclude not only the part of the valueof finishedor unfinished goods that isproduced outside 'industry', butalso the part of thevalue of finishedgoods that is represented byunfinished goods.
Our index of industrialmaterials production doesnot meet any of these specificationsexactly. It includesmost of the principalproducts of the mining industry(though metalsare representedas ingots rather than as ore)and most of theother principalmaterials used in the manufacturingand constructionindustries. But itincludes few finished products ofmanufacturing industriesand no productsof the Construction industry. Itis hard tosay precisely what fractionof total industrial productionis included inour index in the baseyears 1914 and 1939;a fairly conservativeestimate wouldput it at aboutone- fourth. Theomission of themore highly fabricatedproducts means that our index willunderstate the rise intotal output if therehas been a relative increase in thephysical quantity ofhighly fabricatedgoods. Furthermoreour index is constant incomposition, andas pointed out in Section 1, theomission of newproducts probablyimparts a down. ward bias.
So far asmethod ofconstruction isconcerned, our index issome- thing of a hybrid.Since it includesthe output of bothfinished and unfinished goods itresembles an indexconstructed accordingto the second planmentioned above. Butthe method usedto avoid duplica- tion resembles thatof the first,since we usuallyomitted dataon out- put at earlierstages of productionwhen we had datafor a laterstage. This enabledus to use valueweights for allcommodities except those of agriculturalor foreign origin,for which it isnecessary to use value added weightsto limit thecoverage to domesticindustrial production. (For a fullerdescription andanalysis of thecoverage and weighting of our indexsee Appendix A.)
32
SIn order to appraise the ratherdisturbing deficiencies of our own
index we supplement it by two othersthat resemble it in coverage
(the pre-1940 Federal ReserveBoard index and the currentFederal
Reserve Board index excludingmanhours series), and comparethese
three indexes with three thathave a coverage considerablycloser to
that of tht 'ideal': an indexcombining Fabricant's manufacturingand
Barger's miniiiindexes; the current Federal ReserveBoard index of
industrial production; and anindex of gross commodityproduct
based on Kuznets' estimates in 1929prices (Table 9 and Chart7).
TABLE 9
Indexes of industrial' Production,1913-1943
'Figures are for July 1943,adjusted for seasonal variation.
SOURCES:
1) For list of series includedarid their weights see AppendixTables 1, 2, 3. and 5.
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1918 81 60 71



































































102 105 101 93
89
1938 84 82 82 82
100 100
1939 100 100 100 100
1940 115 112 114
1941 135 133 144






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0Since Fabricant'sindex is based on the Censusof Manufactures, it
covers only census years,vhich unfortunately justbridge the interval
in which the llrst war wasfought and end at thebeginning of the
second. Quantity data for alarge and changing listof manufactured
commodities, both finishedand unfinished, arecombined into indus-
try indexes by meansof value (price) weights;the industry indexes
are thenweighted according to valueadded by manufacture.Barger's
index also is based on alarge and changing list ofcommodities (min-
erals), both finishedand unfinished, andweighted by values. Hence
the combined indexof mining and manufacturingconforms to the
second of the two methodsof constrUctiOn indicatedabove. But it is
not so comprehensive as our'ideal' index would be, sincethe products
of the constructionindustry are not included.
The current FederalReserve Board index,though it also purports
to cover miningand manufacturing output,is based on fewer com-
modity series. On theother hand, it isbroader in coverage than our
index: in addition toseries representing theproduction or consump-
tion of basicindustrial materials, anumber of important seriesthat
represent the outputof finished products areincluded. Most of the
latter are estimatedby adjusting manhoursof employment for changes
in output per manhour,at some cost instatistical reliability, as weshall
see. For purposesof analysis we eliminatedthe 'manhoursseries' from
the total: theindex in column 3 issimilar in composition notonly to
our indexof industrialmaterials production butalso to the Federal
(sonrce for Table 9,conci.)
The index for 1913-19is the one computedwith 1914 weights,converted from a 1914
base by multiplying by theindex for 1914 (63A)computed on a 1939 base with1939
weights.
Board of Governors of theFederal Reserve System,Federal Recerve Bulletin,Aug.
1940, p. 807.Converted from 1923-25 baseby dividing by the 1939index, 105.
SeeTable 1, note6.
Board of Governors of theFederal Reserve System, op.cit., Sept. 1943, p. 879.
Converted from 1935-39 baseby dividing by the 1939index, 108.
Weighted average of anindex of manufacturing output(Solomon Fabricant, The
Oulput of Mannfaaurtnglndujtriei, 1899-1937,National Bureau of EconomicResearch,
1940, p. 602) and anindex of mining output(Harold Barger and Sam H.Schurr, The
Miniug Induitriet, 1889-1939:A Study of Outina,Employment and Productivily,
National Bureau of EconomicResearch, 1944). In combiningthe two indexes (by a
modification of the Edgeworthformula) we used 1909 and1919 weights (valueadded
by manufacturin& valueof productS of mining)for the 1914 and 1919indexes, 1919
and 1929 weights for the1919-29 indexes, and 1929and 1937 weights for the 1929-39
indexes, chaining the resultingindexes at 1919 and 1929.
UnpubliShed estimates by SimonKuznets, similar to thosein his Commodity Flow
med Capital Formation,Volume One (NationalBureau of EconomicResearCh, 1938),
p. 480, line VII.Dollar estimates in 1929prices were converted to anindex by dividing
by the 1939 value, $68,975million.
35S
Reserve index as itwas before its revision in 1940.24 Sincethe Federal
Reserve indexes include bothfinished and unfirnshedgoods theyare constructed according to the secondmethod indicated above:value weights are used for mineralproducts, value added formanufactured products.
The index of gross commodityproduct is morecomprehensive than either the Fabricant-Bargeror the current Federal Reserveindex, and is constructed accordingto the first plan. Since itpurports to cover the output of all finishedcommodities (includingproducer durable goods and newconstruction) and additionsto stocks of unthijshed
goods, all valued atcurrent prices (cost to user) butdeflated by price indexes, it is morecomprehensive than an industrialproduction index really should be. Itincludes not onlyunmanufactured agricultural products (finishedperishable commoditiessuch as fresh fruitsand vegetables, finished durablecommodities suchas capital livestock, and changes in stocksof unfinishedcommodities suchas wheat) but also the part of thevalue of finishedmanufactured productsthat is contributed by agriculture.Apparently theagriculturalcomponent, which is hard toeliminate from theestimates, is neither largeenough nor variable enough to affectour analysis greatly. Theadvantage of industrial comprehensivenessis offset, unfortunately,by a lack ofpre- cision, occasionedon the one hand by thelimited amount ofevidence available for estimatingtotal value ofoutput (particularly ininter- censal years) andon the other by thelimited scope ofthe price in- dexes used todeflate these values.
We have thenthree indexes thatapproximate our idealmore or less closely butdiffer considerablyamong themselves incomposition and method ofconstruction (theFabricant.Barger index,the current FRB total index,and grosscommodity product),and three indexes rather alike incomposition andConstruction but much lesscompre- hensive (our index,the pre-1940FRB index, andthe current FRB index excludingthe manhoursseries). Whatconclusions do thecorn- pausons suggest? Sincemost of the possiblecomparisons relate to peacetime, let usexamine first theresults for 1919-39. All the indexesare highly consistentas to direction of change (Table 10). Innine of theten censusyear comparisons allthe in-
to Appendix Tables the proportionof total weightreceived by series of sunllar content usedin all three indexesis 82% in thepre-1940 FRB index (1923.25 weights), 76% in thecurrent FRB indexexcluding manhoursseries (1935-39 weights), and 79% inour industrial materialsproduction index(1939 weights).
36
STABLE 10
Indexes of lndustrial' Production, Percentage Changes, 1913-1943
INDUSTUAL CUUENT PEE INDEX
MAURIALS Exci.
PRODUCTION PRE-1940 Manhours
INDEX PIE INDEX Series Total
(1) (2) (3) (4)



































1920-21 23 22 7
1921-22 +27 +26 +9
1922-23 +19 +19 +17
1 923-24 6 6 2
1924-25 +10 +9 +10
1925-26 +4 +7 +4
1926-27 2 1 +1
1927-28 +5 +5 0
1928-29 +7 +11 +9
1929-30 19 18 14
1930-31 15 18 12
2931-32 21 22 17
1932-33 +18 +19 +2
1933-34 +4 +8 +5
1934-35 +15 +17 +12
1935-36 +16 +17 +21
1936-37 +5 +11 +1
1937-3818222022 4
1938-39 +19 +22 +22 +22 +12
1939-40 +13 +12 +14
1940-41 +17 +19 +26
1941-42 0 +2 +17
1942-43' 0 +13
Computed from indeXes in Table 9.
a Indexes for 1943 are for July, adjusted for seasonal variation.
dexes move consistently; the exception occurs in 1937-39,when gross
product rises while all the other indexes decline.In the 20 year-to-year
comparisons the current and the pre-1940Federal Reserve Board in-
37dexes are perfectlyconsistent in direction ofmovement,25 andbetween these two indexes andgross commodity product thereare only three
disagreements: 1919-20,1926-27, and 192728.28We mayconclude, then, that in peacetimean industrial materialsproduction indexis likely to givean accurate indication of theyear to year directionof movement of total industrialproduction.
The percentagechanges during shortperiods in peacetimetend to be smaller ingross commodity productthan in the otherindexes (Table 11). Theindex that most closelyresemblesour industrial
TABLE 11
















Computed fromentries in Table10, except that incomputing the rankcorrelation Co. efficient tied valueswere eliminated,so far as possible, bycomputing the percentage changes to moredecimal places.Parenthetic entriesare for 192 3-39 (cf.note 25). 25 The 1940revision of theFederal Reserveindex did notcovet 1919-22; the new index was splicedon to the old in1923. Except fora difference in level, then,the current and thepre-1940 indexesare identical from1919 to 1923, and theirpercentage changes in this perioddiffer only becauseof rounding. 26 If the indexof gross commodityproduct werecomputed toone decimal place it would decline from1927 to 1928rather than remainconstant. We are inclinedto doubt its reliabilityin regard to directionof change in allthree periods. Generalbuss-















Year Pre-1940 FEB index& current
PRDindex (3.2) (1.8) (+.98) (+.99) Pre-1940 FRB index& Pabricant-
Barger index
5.0
+ .98 Pre-1940 FRB index& gross
commodityproduct 7.6 6.2 -l-.95 +.86
Gross commodity product 14.6 8.0 Pre-1940 FEB index
17.0 (12.6) 13.2 (11.9) Fabricant-Barger index 18.2 Current FRB index
19.4 (15.6) 14.2 (13.3)materials production index (the pre-1940 Federal Reserve index) oc-
cupies an intermediate position in this respect, but the differencesbe-
tween it and the Fabricant-Barger or the currentFederal Reserve
Board index are not large. The smaller percentage changes in gross
commodity product are perhaps accounted for by its broader scope,
but they may be due also to the method of construction.
To measure roughly the closeness of the relation betweenthe in-
dex that is based largely on materials production and the more com-
prehensive indexes we subtract the percentage changes in theformer
from those in each of the latter and average withoutregard to sign.
The results indicate that the pre-1940 FRBindex is more closely re-
lated to the current FRB index than to the Fabricant-Bargerindex,
and more closely related to the latter than to grosscommodity prod-
uct. These averages represent, ineffect, the average error one would
make in assuming that the percentage changes inindustrial materials
production are identical with those in 'total' industrialproduction.
The assumption, of course, is not necessarilyappropriate; that is, a
better estimate of the change in the totalmight be obtained on the
basis of a different assumption concerning therelationship. In estimat-
ing changes in gross product, forexample, it would clearly be better
to assume that the changewould be in the same direction butsmaiier
than in industrial materials production. In13 of the 20 year-to-year
comparisons the movements in grossproduct are in the same direction
but smaller than in the pre-1940FRB index; in four they are in the
same direction butlarger; in three they are in the oppositedirection.
There is also a tendency for a given risein the pre-1940 FRB index
to be matched by a somewhatgreater rise in the Fabricant-Bargerand
the current FRB index, andfor a given decline to be matched by a
somewhat smaller decline. This occursin eight of ten Census year
comparisons with the Fabricant-Bargerindex, and in ten of the 16
year-to-year comparisons (1923-39)with the current FRB index.
Hence, although the assumptionof identical changes in industrial
materials and 'total' production in thisperiod is a fair first approxima-
tion, it can certainly beimproved.
The limitations of the averageabsolute difference between per-
centage changes as a measureof relationship prompt us tosupple-
ment it with another measurethat is unaffected by theselimitations,
the rank correlation coefficient.According to it, the pre-1940 Federal
Reserve index is as closelyrelated to the Fabricant-Barger as tothe
current Federal Reserveindex, and more closely related tothem than
39
S
$to gross commodityproduct. But thedifferencesamong the coeffi. dents are notlargeall the coefficientsare high.
The comparisonswe can make for thewar years aremore limited in scope, andas far as they go, decidedlydifferent in result,at least for the secondwar. For the firstwar we can make onlya comparison between pre- andpostwar levels: between1914 and1919 our mate- rials productionindex rose19%, the Fabricant-Barger
mining and manufacturing index20%. Despite thelonger intervaland theex- traordinary upheavalit encompassed,the differencebetween these percentage changes issmaller thanany of the differences
between the biennialpercentage changesfrom 1919to 1939 in thepre-1940 Fed- eral Reserveindex and theFabricant-Barger index. Of our 'total'indexes thecurrent FederalReserve indexalone ex- tends beyond j9392?
From 1939 to1940 it rises atabout thesame rate as the materialsindexes (ourindex and theFRB indexexcluding manhours series)- But from 1940 to 1941and from1941 to 1942 it rises muchmore rapidly thanthe materialsindexes. Thedifferences (7 and9% in 1940-41,15 and 17% in1941-42) are largerthan any of thosebetween thepeacetimeyear to year changesin thecurrent and thepre-1940 ReserveBoard indexes(the largest ofwhich is 6%, in 1936-37)- By 1942 the currentFederal Reserveindex reachesa level 68%above 1939,while the indexesbasedon materials produc- tion rise onlyabout halfas much, 35 and36%. Accordingto the monthly figuresin Table 12and Chart8 the differencebecame marked about themiddle of1941. Since thenthe ReserveBoard indexex- duding manhoursseries hasneither risennor declinedappreciably, while the totalindex hascontinuedto advancerapidly. Statistically, thisstrikingdifference,which isequivalent in1942 to one-third ofthe totalproduct ofindustry in1939, is due todiffer- 27Cuxrent estimatesof grossnational productin 1939prices are made bythe Depait.
merit of Commerce,
yielding thefollowing indexes,1939-43: 100,109, 126, 150,179.
(We estimated1943 by addingto the seasonally
adjusted annualrate for the second
quarter one-half ofthe differencebetween thatand thecorresponding figurefor the
first quarter.)This totalincludes bothcommodities andservices; with thebreakdown
provided, it isnot possible toeliminategovernment expendituresfor services, butif
consumer outlay forservices iseliminated, theindex for1939-43 becomes:100, 110,
132, 161, 199.
The more rapidincreases after1940 as comparedwith our indexof materialspro-
duction are indecidedcontrast to the
peacetime relationship.But there isserious doubt
that theDepartment'sestimates for thewar years are
conceptually comparablewith
those forpeacetime, andthat theDepaxtroent'sdeflation procedureis adequate. AS
these questionsare treated inOccasional Paper17: NationalProduct, War and
Prewar, by Simon





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Federal Reserve Board Industrial Production Indexes,











1937 193$ 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 RMjo sc.
ences in the composition of the indexes. In Table13 the subgroup
indexes that are roughlycomparable in coverageare indicated. The
differences in the weighting andin the behavior of the comparable
subindexes are not inconsiderable.But it is as true of thecomponents
of the Federal Reserve Boardindex as it is of thecomponents of our
index that the percentage risesfrom 1941 to 1942were typically small,
and that retardationwas general. The difference between thetwo in-
dexes is due chieflyto two Federal Reserve Boardseries, machinery
and transportationequipment, which contribute18 of the 24 points
(percentage of1939) by whichthe Federal Reserve Boardindex rose
from 1941to 1942.
Now the output of themachinery and transportationequipment
industries is extremely difficultto measure because(1)in any given
year they produce a tremendousvariety of goods, and (2) thegoods produced in differentyears are not the same, especially insuch years as 1941 and 1942, whenmany firms converted from peacetimeto war-
time production__automobilefactories started producing tanks,ma- chine guns, andso on. Consequently, not onlyis it difficult to getan
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































would be hard to combine them, since so many would end in 1941 or
1942, and so many others would begin then.
The Federal Reserve indexes of production of machinery and trans.
portation equipment are constructed by multiplying manhours of
employment in these industries by indexes of output per manhour.
But the difficulties in constructing a production index inevitably attach
also to the construction of a productivity index. For the latterwe need
data on the output of particular products per manhour. Not only
would the possible number of such series be great, but the series them-
selves would be discontinuous. Many, representing peacetime prod-
ucts, would end in 1941 or 1942; and as many others, representing
wartime products, would begin then. How can such data be combined
into a continuous index?
The Federal Reserve Board's solution is toconstruct, by more or
less indirect means, annual or biennial indexes of productionfor these
industries (or to use such indexes constructed byothers) ,28 divide
28 example, a biennial index of machinery production (1923.37)was constructed
by 'deflating' an index of value added in the machinery industry,the deflator being the
ratio of total value added in the iron and steel, nonferrousmetals, and transportation
equipment industries to Fabricant's production index for theseindustries. (Fabricant
has not computed an index for machinery: "In the first place,few of the machinery
industries are covered by adequate quantity dataon output; and in the second place,
the available statistics are ambiguous because the productsare not divided into homo-
geneous subclasses."Ibid., p. 287.)
(Notes to Table 23)
For a list of series included in our indexes andtheir weights see Appendix Tables 1, 2,
3, and 5. The Federal Reserve indexes were computed byus from data published by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Systemin New Federal Reserve index of
Industrial Production (1942); 'Revised SeasonallyAdjusted Indexes of Industrial Pro-
duction,' mimeo. release, Feb. 10, 1943; andFederal Reserve Bulletin, monthly issues
through Sept. 1943.
1So far as possible the groupsare similar in conceptual coverage, i.e., thecoverage assumed in the weighting system. For example,our index of ferrous metals, based on
steel ingot production, was considered comparablewith a Federal Reserve index that includes iron ore, pig iron, and steel ingots,since this coverage is implicit in the weight
we assign to steel ingots. The composition of thevarious groups may be determined
from Appendix Table 5 and the footnotesbelow.
2Except petroleum and coal products(manufactured).
8lncludes all food series in our index, andall food series except 'other manufactured
in the Federal Reserve index.
1Our index includes cotton linters, linseedoil, turpentine, ethyl alcohol, and rubber; Federal Reserve index includes industrialalcohol (since Jan. 1942), and rubberproducts. 5lndudes 'other manufactured foods'.
6lndudes newsprint consumption and printingpaper production.
TChange in index from 1941 to 1942minus the change from 1940to 1941.
a Not available for publication.
44these indexes by manhours of employment in the corresponding years,
draw a smooth free-hand line through the resulting annual or biennial
productivity estimates, and read off monthly productivity estimates
from the free-hand line. After 1939 the construction of thebasic
production indexes was complicated by the absence of a Censusof
Manufactures and by the change in the character of output. The
Board attempts to use all the production data it can obtain, butfor
converted industries it is difficult to see how such data can beused.
In any event, all the productivity estimatesmade by the Board fol-
lowed straight lines sloping gently upward through 1941and 1942,
and for machinery at least, the slope of the line wasdetermined by
the trend in preceding years.
This general procedure for estimating production wasused not only
for transportation equipment (six component seriesbeing estimated
separately: aircraft, automobile bodies, parts andassembly, railroad
cars, locomotives,shipbuilding in private yards, and shipbuilding in
government yards) and machinery, butalso for chemicals, govern-
ment arsenals and quartermasterdepots, 'other' manufactured foods,
and furniture. The entire group of 'manhoursseries received 32%
of the total weight in the index in thebase period 1935-39; by 1942
this figure had increased to 45%,because of the more rapid rise in
this group than in the other series; and byJuly 1943 it had reached
51%.
Probably most of the industries now producingfinished war goods,
such as aircraft, ships, tanks, andordnance, are induded in the man-
hours series. And of course the outputof war goods expanded tre-
mendously between 1940 and 1942. The WarProduction Board's
monthly index of munitions output, startingfrom a level of 23 in
July 1940 (November 1941:100),reaches 64 in July 1941, indicating
an advance ofapproximately 180% from 1940 to 1941. From 1941 to
1942 it rose even more rapidly,the 1942 average being 320, or 351%
above the 1941 average of 71. However,the output of many of the
goods produced in the 'manhoursindustries' in peacetime, such as
automobiles, railroad cars, washing machines,and refrigerators, has
been curtailed, at least since 1941.Furthermore, this process of con-
version has also taken place in someimportant industries not covered
directly by the Federal Reserve index,notably fabricated metal prod.
ucts and construction (theFederal Reserve index, it will berecalled,
purports to measure only ruiningand manufacturing production, not
45construction).Not all the manhours series, of course, represent 'con-
verted' industries; but it is the series that dorepresent converted rn
dustries that account formost of the difference between the Federal
Reserve index and our index. The question is how thewartime output
of these industriescompares, in physical magnitude, with their peace-
time output, and whether, by theuse of series on manhours of em-
ployment adjusted by gradually rising indexes ofoutput per man-
hour, the Reserve Board has really measured thechange.
It seems that all we cansay with certainty concerning total indus-
trial production between 1940 and1942 is that the increase in input of
labor, measured in manhours, greatly exceededthe increase in input
of materials (Table 14). Manhours ofwage earner employment in
manufacturing increased 9% from1939 to 1940, 30% from 1940 to
1941, and 22% from 1941 to 1942. If manhoursof employment in
mining were included, thepercentage increases after 1940 would be
somewhat less, since total employment inmining increased 8% from
1939 to 1940 but only 1% from 1940 to 1941, and declined1% from
1941 to 1942. If manhours in constructionwork were also included,
the percentage increase from1939 to 1940 might be reduced slightly,
that from 1940 to 1941 augmented, andthat from 1941 to 1942re-
duced, since thepercentage changes in construction employmentin
these years are 6, 31 and5, respectively. Hence total manhours of
wage earner employment in manufacturing,mining, and construction
2The degree of conversion between1939 and April 1943 in 35 metal fabricating industries is indicated inan article by Richard H. Lewis, 'Conversion of MetalWork. ing industries to War Production,1939-43',Monthly LaborReview, Dec. 1943. Con- version is defined as the "shift ofa plant from one industrial classificationto another, as the result of a change in its major product".The extent of Conversion ina given industry is measured by thepercentage of total employees in the industryin April 1943 who were employed in plants which,on the basjs of current output, would be classified in a different industry. Thesepercentages range from 7.1 for the radio andphonograph industry to 100.0 for the washingmachine industry. Twenty industrieswere more than 50% converted. Of the 2,950,100 employeesin all 35 industries in April 1943,57.6% were employed in converted plants. The employmentin plants that continued topro- duce their major peacetime productdeclined 22% between June1940 and April 1943, while the total employment in allplants increased 85%.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3probably advanced about 8% from1939 to 1940, 30% from 1940 to
1941, and 16-18% from 1941to 1942, or approximately 65% from
1939 to 1942.These increases contrast sharply with those registered
by our index of industrialmaterials production and the Federal Re-
serve index excluding manhours series:15 and 12%, respectively,
from 1939 to 1940,17 and 19% from 1940 to 1941, 0 and 2% from
1941 to 1942, or 35 and 36% from1939 to 1942. Although these in.
dexes do not stricily relateto, and may understate the increase in the
consumption of materials (owingto limitations of coverage and,pos-
sibly, consumption ofstocks) it does not seem likely thatconsump-
tion of materials increasednearly so rapidly, after 1940,as manhours
of employment. Thetotal Federal Reserve index,on the other hand,
rose almost as rapidly, after 1940,as total manhours.
In peacetime, when it ispossible to make industrialclassifications that remain relativelyhomogeneous, at least for shortintervals, one
can determine with some confidencethe relative merits oftwo pos-
sible interpretations ofa more rapid increase in labor than inmate- rials input: (i) thata greater proportion of labor relativeto mate-
rials is required to producegiven products (implyinga decline in out- put per unit of labor), and (2)that the composition ofoutput has shifted in the directionof products that ordinarilyrequire more labor relative to materials.30But in the transition frompeace to war it is
impossible to make suchhomogeneous classificationsfor much of finished goodsoutput. The automobile industryis no longer theauto-
29 Since the abovestatements were written the Bureau ofLabor Statistics has released preliminary estimates ofmanhours of wageearner employment in these industries ('Manhours in Agricu1tureMining, Manufacturing,and Construction,19391943', Jan. 1944). Thepercentage changes in the annualaverages of the monthly figuresare:
193940 1940-41 1941-42 1939-42 Mining
+13 +12 + 8 +36 Manufacturing + 9 +32 +24 +78 Construction
+19 +49 - 1 +75 Total
+11 +33 +20 +75 °Actually, this situation doesnot seem to have arisen in1919-39. The average year to year percentage chinge inan index of manhours ofwage earner employment inmanu- facturing (SolomonFabricant,Emplojmen, in Manufacturing,
1899.1939,National Bureau of Economic Research,1942. p. 331) is 12.0; thecorresponding figure for the pre-1940 Federal Reserve indexis 13.2. Theyear to year directions ofmovement of the two indexes are thesame except in two instances:1919-20, when the productionindex rises 5% while themanJiouindex declines 2%, and1927-28, when the production index rises 5% while themanhours index declines1%. The average differencebetween the year to yearpercentage changes in thetwo indexes is 3.8%, andin only two instances (1933-34 and1936-37) does the manhoursindex rise more rapidlythan the index based on materialsproduction.
48mobile industry when, instead ofproducing automobiles, it produces
munitions. Hence in such a transitionperiod, if the proportion of
labor to materials increases, onewould have great difficulty in choos-
ing between explanations(1) and (2) or assessing their relative im-
portance.
Under these circumstances it seemsbest to abandon any attempt to
measure totalindustrial production, for the fact of conversionlends
an elementof arbitrariness, unreality, and uncertainty to anyindex
that purports to measurethe total. There is arbitrariness inthe choice
of weight factors used tocombine discontinuous series; there is un-
reality in the idea ofcomparing aggregates that, to a large extent,
consist of commodities not commonto both peace and warperiods;
there is uncertainty becausewidely different results can beobtained
by different methodsof selecting (a) the weight factorsmentioned
above, and (b) the seriesthat are to be included. We do notbelieve
these difficulties attach, tonearly the same extent, to anindex of in-
dustrial materials production.This does not mean that such anindex
measures total output;but it does measure a part thatit is feasible to
measure, a partthat is of interest per se,and a part that does influence
the aggregate amountof commodities produced inboth peacetime and
wartime.31 While no preciserule can be formulated todetermine
when it is and when itis not feasible to construct aproduction index,
it is our opinion thatthere is an insufficientstatistical basis for an
index of total output inWorld War I, and that inWorld War II,
while the statisticaldata are more comprehensive,the conceptual
difficulty is much greaterbecause conversion hasbeen more extensive.
Whether or not it ispossible to arrive at aninformed judgment con-
cerning the changes indegree of fabricationof materials and in pro-
ductivity of labor in the two warperiods, we think there islittle ad-
vantage and somereal danger in incorporatingthese impressions in
an index. Atleast the basis for themand the margin of errorshould
be dearly stated.
These conclusions areforced upon us by thetransformation in the
31 In this connection one mustbe careful not to misinterpretthe rather close relation
between materials and totalproduction in peacetime. Theimplications of this relation
are (a) that inpeacetime similar results(the degree of similarity isindicated) can be
obtained with a wide varietyof indexes, and (b) that inpeacetime a materials index,
such as ours, does not givemarkedly distorted results. Itfollows that the wartime
difference between our indexand the current FRB indexis not only unprecedentedin
terms of peacetimeexperience, but also is not tobe explained by anyidiosyncrasy of
our index that appearsin peacetime. It does notfollow that a materials index, or any
other index, will properly measuretotal output in wartime.
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character of industrial production between 1941 and 1942. Twofur.
ther implications may be considered. By the summeror autumn of
1942 most of the conversion of industry from peace towar output had
apparently beenaccomplished.32Granting that total output in 1942
is incommensurable with total output in 1941or prior years, what of
total output since? While industry is ona war basis, an index that
comprehends at least the greater part of industrial productionis
theoretically conceivable, though the question whether dataadequate
to compute it are available is worth serious consideration.On the
other hand, once the war is ended, there will presumablybe another
and opposite transformation in the character ofoutput, during which
it will again be difficult tomeasure changes in the total. However,
so far as the goods produced in that future peacetimeeconomy
resemble those of prewar days (andsome say the resemblance will
be slight!), it will be possible tocompute indexes of total' output
that span the war, such as those Fabricantcomputed for 1914
and 1919.
We contemplate, then, two indexes oftotal industrial production:
a u'artirne index that begins when conversion of industryto war pro-
duction has been substantially completedand ends when reconversion
begins to be important, anda peacetime index that omits the period
covered by the wartime index and alsothe accompanying periods of
conversion and reconversion. Asto the probable behavior of these in-
dexes we can offer onlysome highly tentative observations. The diver-
gence between the Federal Reserve index exdudingmanLours series
and the total Federal Reserve indexcontinues after the middle of
1942. Which, if either, correspondsto our hypothetical index ofwar-
time industrial production?The validity of the increasesregistered
by the manhours series aftermid-1942 is still open to question,since
considerable uncertainty attachesto the productivity indexes. Some
rise, in any event, in the manhoursseries as a whole is indicated by
the fact that war outputcontinued to expand, thoughnot so rapidly
as before (the WPB munitions indexrose 75from July 1942 to
July 1943, as compared with43Ofrom July 1941 to July1942). Another vexing questionconcerning the manhoursseries after mid-
1942 is their weights. So faras their increases up to that timeare arbitrary or meaningless,so also are their weightsas of that date. It is reasonable tosuppose, however, thata rerision of the weights
Cf. Dtisioa of Information,War Pmduajoc Bj 'WuProth in 1942'. pp. 12.3.
50would not greatly affect therelations between the manhoursand other
series in the index,and that their combinationwould register an in-
crease afterthe middle of 1942. If someindex of construction activity
were included,the increase would certainlybe reduced (cf. Table 14).
Hence the rise inthis hypothetical index ofindustrial production
after the summerof 1942 might be smaller orlarger than the actual
increaseregistered by the Federal Reserveindex (15% from July
1942 to July 1943),but it would probablyexceed the negligible
change recordedby the index excluding themanhours series. The rise
would probably notcontinue beyond 1943,for the Federal Reserve
index is showing signsof nearing apeak.0
As for a comparisonthat spans the war, it seemsthat unless there
is a revolutionarYchange in the compositionof peacetime output,
involving a greaterproportion of goodsrequiring much labor rela-
tive to materials, ourhypothetical peacetime indexof industrial pro-
duction shouldcorrespond rather closely to anindex based on mate-
rials output. Such arevolution may well be in process;but if not, the
implication is that afterthe war the FederalReserve index will re-
sume its prewarposition relative tomaterials output, and thattotal
manhours of industrialemployment will dolikewise. Such a realign-
inent might comeabout through a declinein the Federal Reserve
index and in totalmanhours, or by a rise inthe output ofindustrial
$ The recently revisedFederal Reserve index (d. note4) exhibits this tendencyless
dearly. The new index rises morerapidly than the old, especiallyafter 1941, and while
a leveling offafter February 1943 isperceptible in the old index itis scarcely visible
in the new. New FederalRejerve Index
July 1943
1939 1940 1941 1942 (5ear.adj.)
1935-39:100 109 125 162 199 239
1939:100
100 115 149 183 219
These alterations werebrought about largely bythe revision of theold manhours
series and the additionof several new ones (inJune 1943 series ofthis type received
5R% of the weight in the newindex, 50% in the old).The addition of 18.4points
(1935.39:100) to the 1942 averageof the new ascompared with the old indexis
accounted for as follows:
i) Revision of oldmanhours series: 15.0points
Addition of new manhoursseries: 1.8 points
Revision of other series:1.6 points
As in the old index, manyof the manhours series arebased on annual(sometimes
quarterly) production indexes;that is, in many casesthe monthly figures onmanhours
are used merely tointerpolate (or extrapolate)production data.Apparently the use of
actual physical productiondata for this purposewas considerablyextended and the
reliability of the productivityestimates therebyenhanced. Our comments onthe measure-
ment of the outputof converted industriesarid the effect of thesemeasurements on the
total index apply, however, toboth the new and theold version.
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materials, or by other compensating changes.While it would bein-
teresting to speculateon the likelihood of the various possibilities,it
cannot be clone in this paper.84
84 It is dangerous in thisConnection to point to our experience afterWorld War I, if for no other reason than that,since the:e are no comprehensive dataon manhours during the lust war, we do not know whethersuch data would indicate a 'gap' similarto that which has now developed betweenmanhours and materials output. We doknow, how- ever, that: (1) the rises between 1914 and1919 in our materials production indexand in the more comprehensiveFabricarit.Barger index of mining andmanufacturing are nearly identical (19 and 20%,respectively); (2) the rise between1914 and 1919 in Fabricants index of manhours ofwage earner employment in manufacturingis almost the same (21%; cf. Solomon Fabricant,ibid., p. 331); and (3)our index of materials output declined 6% from 1918 to1919.
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